Briefly, in October 2004, Rice (a mentally disabled veteran) obtained a Limited Equity Home Ownership Program (LEHP) below-market-rate condominium (BMR) thru a lottery process, all of which was administered by the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA), a State of California agency. The controlling agreement (LEHP Declaration of Resale Restrictions and Option to Purchase Agreement) contained a restriction that required “written” consent from the Agency to lease a portion of his BMR (i.e. having rent-paying roommates). The Agreement also required residency ten months every calendar year but, with “written” consent, less than ten months was allowed.

In 2012, all the State of California Redevelopment Agencies were closed, and the “assets” of the SFRA were transferred to the San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community Development (MOHCD), which became the administrating agency of the LEHP (Program).

On or about December 2008, by phone, Rice verbally requested from Edith Horner (his primary contact at the SFRA) permission to have roommates and to be allowed to travel more than two months per calendar year, Horner verbally consented (but did not provide any guidance on the “written” consent requirement). In any case, from numerous conversations with Rice, Horner (and the SFRA) fully knew of Rice’s disabled status and his disability related needs (i.e. symptoms of his mental illness, predominantly isolation and loneliness, as well as depression). And, thereafter, Rice did have rent-paying roommates and did travel more than two months per calendar year. In March 2016, Rice read the controlling agreement throughly for the first time and saw the “written” consent requirement. Rice immediately reached out to Horner (then a CCSF employee) via email, and to Garrett Smith of the MOHCD by voicemail, and informed them of his lack of “written” consent, neither Horner or Smith responded despite prior communications.

IMPORTANT – accommodations under the Fair Housing Act are not required to be in writing. Whereas, what the MOHCD call policy “exceptions” are required to be in writing per the controlling Limited Equity Home Ownership Agreement (LEHP).

When the MOHCD (specifically Cissy Yin and Maria Benjamin of the MOHCD, and Deputy City Attorney Keith Nagayama) finally responded (on October 26, 2017) to Rice’s (and his physician’s) request to obtain the “written” consent for his disability related accommodation, the MOHCD sent an “Action Required” letter that was completely void of any recognition of Rice’s disability, his disabled status, and his disability related needs (and “rights”) under the FHA, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and San Francisco’s Planning Department Code sec. 305.1 (which establishes CCSF’s “policy for people with disabilities”, “a process for making and acting upon requests for reasonable modifications to the regulations, policies, practices, and procedures of the Planning Department and Code” — which governs the MOHCD). And, it was completely void of any information that the Planning Department’s Zoning Administrator is CCSF’s authorized person to make and act on requests for reasonable accommodation in the LEHP (NOT the MOHCD).

Instead of providing the disability related information Rice needed (as required by fair housing law), Yin, Benjamin, and Nagayama ORDERED Rice to abandon his verbally obtain accommodation to have rent-paying roommates. and THREATENED him with “enforcement action” if he did not comply. Out of great fear, Rice immediately complied.

Thereafter, despite Rice’s very numerous attempts over several months to obtain information about maintaining or re-obtaining his valid disability related accommodation for rent-paying roommates under fair housing law (including CCSF’s own ordinance) CCSF, et al. (especially Cissy Yin, Maria Benjamin, and Keith Nagayama) never provided any information they were required to provide Rice under fair housing law (including CCSF’s own ordinance). Instead, they only communicated certain parts of CCSF’s affordable housing program’s policies. That is, they concealed relevant information they were otherwise required to provide to Rice, including the previously stated fact that the San Francisco Planning Department’s Zoning Administrator is CCSF’s person to make and act on requests for reasonable accommodation in the LEHP (not the MOHCD).

Put another way, instead of applying FHA standards and the City’s disability accommodation process, he City used its affordable housing rules, policies, practices, or services to interfere with, and to deny, Mr. Allison Barton Rice’s disability rights under fair housing law and City ordinance which violated the mandates and protections of the FHA, regardless if it was done so fraudulently or not.

Thus, the conflict that created Allison Barton Rice v. City and County of San Francisco, et al.

To be clear, had CCSF, especially employees Cissy Yin, Maria Benjamin, and Keith Nagayama referred Mr. Allison Barton Rice to the Planning Department’s Zoning Administrator (as they were required to do), Rice would have received appropriate processing and consideration of his requested disability related accommodation. And, had they done so, it is extremely unlikely this Kafkaesque legal ordeal would have ever existed.

Quoting the District Court: “I think — this is for Mr. Rice. I was completely wrong on my round one motion to dismiss, not just because the Ninth Circuit told me so but in sort of rethinking it, Mr. Rice was right in his round one motion, and I’m convinced of that now, and, again, not just because the Ninth Circuit told me, but I too got — you know, I got sucked into the affordable housing in San Francisco, and that wasn’t something I should have done in a motion to dismiss phase, and — but I got sucked in by it because I thought, well, San Francisco is trying to do what it can for affordable housing. But Mr. Rice was right and said — so said the Ninth Circuit. And I’m convinced now that that’s — that’s right. Like, I was wrong. So, you know, I’m always glad to know when I’m wrong.” (June 15th 2023 pretrial hearing — one day before the start of the trial — transcript, p. 66, 12-25.)

To be clear and certain, “Mr. Rice was right” the entire time, and still is. Because, simply, throughout the entire time of owning the affordable housing unit, Mr. Rice told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth — and continues to do just that. Whereas, defendant City and County of San Francisco, et al. was overwhelmingly dishonest about every relevant fair housing issue

Point of clarification by me (i.e. “Mr. Rice”): In my view, the District Court (i.e. the Honorable Laurel Beeler) wasn’t “wrong” — instead, [She] was “wronged” (i.e. “got sucked into the affordable housing in San Francisco”) by the City Attorney’s’ “affordable housing” program narrative (i.e. reframing) as opposed to the applicable and truthful (i.e. “Mr. Rice was right”) Fair Housing Act, inclusive of disability and fair housing laws, narrative (i.e. frame) asserted in both my original and amended complaints, which I continue to assert because it is the truth. Pointedly, please consider my physician’s September 19, 2017 letter (mailed by her directly to the MOHCD) and, without any inquiry, the MOHCD’s October 26th 2017 “Action Required” letter (by Cissy Yin, Maria Benjamin, and Keith Nagayama) sent to, and received by, me on October 26, 2017. Lastly, the Honorable Beeler held herself accountable. The critical question is, will the District Court (or any court of jurisdiction) ever hold the City Attorney and Deputy City Attorneys involved in this case accountable for sucking the District Court “into the affordable housing in San Francisco”?

That being said, in my current multiple re-reviews of pretrial transcripts, it appears the Honorable Beeler condoned and encouraged the City’s counsel and my court-appointed counsel to replace my FHA § 3617 (multi-part) interference claim with the City’s “affordable-housing-agreement” compliance theory. Which is not even a claim, it’s simply a statement. And, that’s exactly where it entered this case, in an unsigned so-called “Amended Draft Joint Statement” at ECF No. 188 filed by deputy City attorney Raymond Rollan (so says the docket). But, maybe someone else filed it, like deputy City Attorney Renée E. Rosenblit or my own court-appointed counsel Ramsey W. Fisher, and just used Mr. Rollan’s name. Anyway, consider these excerpts from the May 25, 2023 pretrial transcript:

Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler starts with: “Is it really true that you guys can’t agree on a joint statement of the case? I will write it for you, and it won’t be what you want. If you agree on a joint statement of the case, I’ll let you do attorney voir dire and do a mini opening during voir dire, giving all the newer lawyers great experience.” (Tr. 1:25-2:5)

In immediate response to this judicial pressure, Rice’s counsel abandoned his client’s explicit written vetoes to secure the district court’s procedural rewards, stating: “Your Honor, I think we can agree. I think if you give us maybe 15 minutes after this, we can — we could probably come to agreement — and that will be fine.” (Tr. 2:6-10)

Magistrate Judge Beeler then explicitly locked in this conditional requirement, stating: “And what we do is, you file a joint statement saying we agree. It’s only if you agree on it, because we can’t tell if there’s really for-cause if you disagree.” (Tr. 13:21-23)

Rice’s counsel and the City’s counsel appear to have immediately formulated the unauthorized compromise in the background. The district court’s active validation of this real-time circumvention was completed just moments later at the conclusion of that same exchange, with the district court stating: “We’ve already talked about jury questions, talked about joint statement of the case. Thanks for working it out.” (Tr. 15:16-17) And, a bit later, “So, Elaine, on the minute order, say parties will submit joint statement of case today, parties will submit sealing stipulation within one week.” (Tr. 31:16-18)

Once counsel finalized the altered text (i.e. claim replacement) and filed it the next day via ECF Nos. 188 and 189, the district court codified that unapproved, entirely limiting and prejudicial, contract-compliance text into its June 13, 2023 “Proposed Preliminary Jury Instructions” at ECF No. 202..

This section is for anyone that cares to have more details of my lawsuit against CCSF. Litigation begins, District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, appearing pro se, Case No. 19-cv-04250 LB: my Original Complaint and Exhibits, CCSF’s Motion to Dismiss, my Opposition, CCSF’s Reply, District Court’s Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend. Amended Complaint, CCSF’s Motion to Dismiss, my Opposition, CCSF’s Reply, Declaration of Dr. Ludwig in Support of [my] Claims, District Court’s Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice.

Initial appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, appearing pro se, Case No. 20-15087; Opening, Answering, and Reply Briefs at Dkt. Nos. 2.0, 8.0, and 15.0, respectively), Ninth Circuit’s Memorandum reversing dismissal of my FHA claims.

Back at the District Court … this part is a lot, will take time (i.e. work in progress). Going to start with the December 22, 2022 hearing transcript, May 25, 2023 hearing transcript, June 15, 2023 hearing transcript, and the trial transcript. — at the Ninth Circuit — subsequent to the Ninth Circuit’s Mandate, I am back at the District Court which filed the Ninth Circuit’s Mandate on July 17, 2026. My July 21, 2026 Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief of Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) or, in the Alternative, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) For Fraud on the Court; [Proposed] Order, followed by my July 22, 2026 Correct description of Ex. G attached to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment at ECF No. 288. CCSF’s Opposition and Plaintiff’s Reply, Stipulated Administrative Motion to Continue the Hearing Date. Motion for Relief of Judgement Denied. Back to the Ninth Circuit to file an Appeal of the district court’s denial of my Motion for Relief of Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) or, in the Alternative, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) (i.e. Denial of Motion appeal).

Direct appeal in the Ninth Circuit seeking reversal of judgment, appearing pro se, Case No. 23-16013; Opening, Answering, and Reply Briefs at Dkt. Nos. 17.1, 26.1, and 31.1, respectively.

Costs appeal in the Ninth Circuit seeking reversal of award of CCSF’s Bill of Costs, appearing pro se, Case No. 24-2217; Opening, Answering, and Reply Briefs at Dkt. Nos. 7.1, 12.1, and 18.1, respectively. Unexpected June 17, 2026 Ninth Circuit (Dkt 30) Order (“The Court is inclined to appoint pro bono counsel to represent appellant [Rice] in this appeal.”), and my June 17, 2026 (Dkt 31) Response (accepting the Court’s appointment of pro bono counsel to represent me in this appeal). The Court appoint Kathryn M. Davis and Peter Afrasiabi of the UC Irvine School of Law Appellate Litigation Clinic as pro bono counsel. A mediation conference is to take place next.

Direct appeal: My May 2, 2026 (Dkt 65) Motion for referral to the Ninth Circuit’s Standing Committee under Circuit Rule 46-2 to investigate CCSF’s counsel’s violations of FRAP 46(c) and ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(1),(3), CCSF’s Counsel’s May 12, 2026 (Dkt 66) Opposition, and my May 13, 2026 (Dkt 67) Reply. My May 29, 2026 (Dkt 72) Motion to Appear Remotely and Statement in Support of Oral Argument. Without oral argument, the Ninth Circuit’s June 2, 2026 (Dkt 73) Memorandum, Judgement AFFIRMED.

My June 5, 2026 (Dkt 74) Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, my June 9, 2026 (Dkt 75) Motion to Submit Addendum to Petition for Panel Rearing and Rehearing En Banc, my June 18, 2026 (Dkt 77) Corrected Motion for Appointment of Counsel [in this appeal], and my June 23, 2026 (Dkt 79) Motion, reclassified by the Court to the appropriate Rule 28(j) Citation of Supplemental Authorities in Support of my Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. CCSF’s June 29, 2026 (Dkt 80) Response to my motion for Appointment of Counsel, my June 30, 2026 (Dkt 81) reply. My June 30, 2026 (Dkt 82) Notice of Potential Transcript-Completeness Issue and Motion to Stay Appellate Proceedings Pending District Court Determination Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e). Additional July 2, 2026 (Dkt 83) Rule 28(j) and July 5, 2026 (Dkt 84) Rule 28(j) Citation in further Support of my Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. The Ninth Circuit’s July 6, 2026 (Dkt 85) Order, everything DENIED. My July 7, 2026 (Dkt 86) Motion to Stay Issuance of the Mandate Pending Preparation and Filing of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari (in the United States Supreme Court), July 8, 2026 (Dkt 87) Order, Rice’s motion to stay the mandate (Docket No. 86) is DENIED. No further motions will be entertained in this case. July 16, 2026 (Dkt 88) Mandate. Returning to the District Court (above).

Denial of Motion appeal: First, I filed a Motion and Affidavit for Permission to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. Then a Motion for Appointment of Counsel and a Motion to Stay Briefing and Transcript-Related Deadlines Pending Resolution of Motion for Appointment of Counsel, or in the Alternative for extension of time. Appellant’s Notice That He Does Not Intend to Order Any Additional Transcripts for This Appeal. Appellees’ Response to Appellant’s Motion to Appoint Counsel. Appellant’s Reply in Support of Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Ninth Circuit’s Order to Show Cause. My Letter to the Court Requesting Immediate Consideration of Appointment of Counsel. Appellant’s Statement Appeal Should Go Forward. Appellant’s Motion for Leave to Submit Supplemental Medical Recommendation in Support of Pending Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Request for 21 Days to Submit Recommendation.

The key fact is this: on June 27, 2026, Rice discovered that his own court-appointed counsel had joined the City’s counsel in placing the City’s affordable-housing-agreement compliance theory before the jury as if it were Rice’s 42 U.S.C. § 3617 interference claim. ECF Nos. 188, 189. Before that discovery, Rice believed that only the City’s counsel was responsible for the replacement, and his Rule 60(d)(3) theory focused on whether that replacement had been accomplished through improper or fraudulent means.

That discovery mattered because court-appointed counsel were not merely exercising ordinary trial discretion. They owed Rice duties of loyalty, communication, and candor sufficient to allow informed decisions about the representation, and they owed duties of candor and integrity to the court as officers of the court. Those duties are implicated when counsel joins or submits, or permits the submission of, a jury-facing claim description that the client did not approve, that contradicted the client’s written instructions, and that replaced the client’s FHA interference claim with the opposing party’s affordable-housing-agreement compliance theory. ….

Rice’s position is that counsel did not simply choose one reasonable trial emphasis over another. Rice’s position is that the record supports a nonfrivolous argument that his § 3617 interference claim was replaced by counsel with the City’s affordable-housing-agreement compliance theory through a documented sequence involving ECF Nos. 182, 188, 189, 201, 202, 204, 210, 212, 218, and 221, despite Rice’s written instructions, without Rice’s approval, and without correction after Rice objected before trial.

Nor does Rice’s pretrial awareness that something was wrong defeat nonfrivolous review. Awareness of a problem is not legally equivalent to discovering and understanding the full Rule 60 basis. The full basis required Rice, after judgment and while pro se, to cross-reference a complex sequence of filings, proposed instructions, final instructions, pretrial orders, written directives, concurrence representations, and transcript excerpts. That distinction matters especially because Rice is a litigant with a severe mental-illness disability that itself creates substantial obstacles to navigating complex litigation, and because he lacks the legal education and training ordinarily necessary to identify, preserve, and present these issues while opposing institutional defendants represented by experienced counsel. Rule 60(b)(6)’s equitable framework permits consideration of those circumstances, and Rule 60(d)(3) separately permits review of whether the filing and concurrence irregularities undermined the integrity of the adjudication process.

Finally, the separate § 3617 elements instruction does not eliminate the issue. The issue is not whether the jury heard abstract statutory elements in isolation. As reflected by the record, the issue is that the jury-facing claim description told the jury to decide something that simply was not Rice’s § 3617 claim. The jury was directed away from Rice’s actual FHA interference theory and toward the City’s affordable-housing-agreement compliance theory, supporting a nonfrivolous argument that the prejudice went to the legal framework through which the jury evaluated the evidence.

For these reasons, Rice respectfully submits that the appeal presents arguable issues on the merits and should be allowed to go forward.

My Petition for Writ of Certiorari delivered / submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court on October 2, 2026:

Question Presented

Whether a Fair Housing Act judgment may stand where a disabled homeowner alleges that a municipal housing-program administrator and its counsel maintained a misleading local affordable-housing-agreement compliance narrative that displaced his federal reasonable-accommodation and interference claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(3)(B) and 3617, so that the jury was never asked to decide those claims under the governing FHA framework. …

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) provides that discrimination includes:

a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.

42 U.S.C. § 3617 provides:

It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.

Statement of the Case

Petitioner’s disability-related accommodation request

Petitioner Allison Barton Rice is a disabled homeowner who lived in a limited-equity affordable-home-ownership housing unit administered by the San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community Development. The program did not categorically prohibit rent-paying roommates; Rice contends that rent-paying roommates were allowed in an undeterminable number of situations, including, but not limited to, primarily financial-hardship situations and work-related-relocation situations. Rice’s disability-related housing need included the ability to have a rent-paying roommate as a reasonable accommodation. Rice contends that this accommodation was necessary for him to use and enjoy his dwelling and remain housed because it ameliorated the symptoms and issues of his severe mental disability and, in contrast, there was no other accommodation that accomplished or satisfied that necessary element.

During the relevant period, Rice’s physician submitted a letter recommending that Rice be allowed roommates and travel for mental-health reasons. And, in litigation and at trial, Rice’s physician clarified and maintained her recommendation was for “rent-paying” roommates and that “non-rent-paying” roommates did not ameliorate Rice’s symptoms and issues.  The City received the physician’s letter and admitted that it understood Rice was requesting an accommodation. The City also admitted that its own rules required an inquiry, but that it did not conduct that inquiry before rejecting or acting against the requested accommodation. Rice contends that the City nevertheless did not process the request through the FHA accommodation framework, did not meaningfully inquire into the disability-related need, did not engage in an accommodation inquiry, and did not truthfully explain or apply his FHA rights. Instead, the City responded with an “Action Required” letter that was entirely void of any fair housing information, acknowledgement of Rice’s disability and his request for accommodation, and his physician’s recommendation.

The relevant state and local framework also pointed toward an accommodation inquiry, not away from one. San Francisco Planning Code § 305.1 identified a local reasonable-modification in regulations, policies, practices and procedures process for disability-related residential requests, and California fair-housing law recognized accommodation and interactive-process obligations in housing. Rice contends that those state and local frameworks reinforced, rather than displaced, the federal FHA accommodation inquiry. Yet the City did not route his request through an accommodation framework and instead treated the matter as affordable-home-ownership-housing-program compliance.

The City treated the matter as affordable-housing-agreement compliance

Instead of treating Rice’s request as an FHA accommodation request, the City treated the matter as a local affordable-housing-agreement compliance dispute. The City’s position was that Rice had violated, or had to comply with, affordable-home-ownership-housing rules concerning renting, roommates, occupancy, or refinancing. Rice contends that this local compliance frame displaced the federal FHA questions that should have governed his disability-related request.

That displacement matters because the FHA does not ask only whether a local housing rule exists. Section 3604(f)(3)(B) asks whether a reasonable accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services may be necessary to ameliorate the symptoms or issues of a person’s disability and, thus, afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. Section 3617 separately prohibits coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with the exercise or enjoyment of FHA-protected rights.

Rice contends that the misleading local-compliance frame originated with the City’s “Action Required” letter and continued through the litigation. In Rice’s view, the City’s approach supplied a practical method for avoiding the FHA: never acknowledge or apply disability-rights and fair-housing-rights principles, discuss only local program rules, and then litigate the case as if the disabled person’s accommodation request were ordinary rule noncompliance. Rice argued that this narrative diverted the district court and jury from the FHA accommodation and interference framework and amounted to fraud on the district court.

The wrong frame reached the jury through the jury-facing claim description

The displacement occurred through the jury-facing claim frame. Rice contends that, in violation of his express written instructions, his own court-appointed counsel joined opposing counsel in placing the City’s affordable-housing-agreement compliance theory before the jury as if it were Rice’s § 3617 interference claim, even though Rice’s § 3617 claim concerned interference with his FHA-protected accommodation rights, not whether he complied with the City’s affordable-housing agreement.

“Plaintiff Allison Rice brings this lawsuit against the Defendant City and County of San Francisco. Plaintiff brings two claims against the City under the Fair Housing Act. First, Plaintiff Allison Rice alleges that the City discriminated against him on the basis of his disability when it denied his request for a rent-paying roommate. Second, Plaintiff Allison Rice claims that the City unlawfully interfered with his rights under the Fair Housing Act by requiring him to terminate his lease with his then rent-paying roommate and by holding up his efforts to refinance until he complied with the terms of his affordable housing agreement.” (ECF No. 189 at 5:8-15) (emphasis added)

The district court later characterized that displacement as counsel’s strategic choice. Rice’s position is that the problem is more fundamental. The issue is not ordinary disagreement with trial tactics, ordinary sufficiency review, or dissatisfaction with an adverse verdict. The issue is whether the jury was ever asked to decide Rice’s FHA reasonable-accommodation and interference claims under the governing federal framework at all.

The FHA frame was not fairly adjudicated at trial

Rice’s theory was not merely that the City applied its affordable-home-ownership-housing rules incorrectly. His theory was that the City’s use of those rules, without applying the FHA accommodation framework, denied or interfered with his federal fair-housing rights. Rice also argued that the City’s framing misdirected the litigation away from the FHA accommodation and interference issues and toward local program compliance.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury returned a verdict for the City. Judgment was entered on June 26, 2023.

On appeal, Rice argued pro se that the litigation and trial had been diverted from the FHA framework into an affordable-housing-agreement compliance frame. He argued that the jury was never fairly asked to decide whether the City violated § 3604(f)(3)(B) or § 3617 under the correct federal standards.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed on procedural and deferential grounds

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished memorandum disposition. The court held that Rice waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by failing to file a post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion. During the post-verdict period, Rice still had court-appointed pro bono counsel, and Rice contends that counsel remained silent about any post-verdict or post-judgment motions he should consider. Rice terminated his relationship with court-appointed counsel after judgment was entered. The court also stated that Rice failed to identify plain error in the district court’s jury instructions. It rejected an evidentiary issue as harmless because the jury found no FHA violation. It rejected Rice’s unfair-trial contentions as unsupported by the record or as barred by the general rule that civil litigants have no right to effective assistance of counsel.

Rice sought panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. He explained that his appeal was not merely a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, not merely an ordinary jury-instruction challenge, and not merely a request to reweigh the evidence. Rather, Rice argued that the appeal presented an antecedent legal-framework question: whether the case was adjudicated under the correct FHA accommodation and interference standards at all. Rice also argued that Appellees’ litigation conduct created and maintained a misleading affordable-housing-program narrative that diverted the district court and jury from the FHA accommodation and interference framework, and he characterized that conduct as fraud on the district court. The Ninth Circuit did not separately address that argument. The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing on July 6, 2026.

This petition follows.

Reasons for Granting the Petition

The petition presents an important Fair Housing Act framework question

This case presents an important question about the administration of disability accommodations in public and taxpayer-supported housing programs. The FHA applies to housing programs and protects disabled persons from discrimination, including the refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when such accommodations may be necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. The FHA also separately protects persons from coercion, intimidation, threats, and interference with the exercise or enjoyment of FHA-protected rights.

The question here is whether a government housing-program administrator may avoid the FHA accommodation and interference framework by treating a disability-related request as ordinary program noncompliance and maintaining that frame through litigation and trial. If that is allowed, then the federal accommodation inquiry may disappear precisely when it is most needed. A disabled person’s request can be reclassified as a local compliance problem, and the jury may never fairly decide whether federal law required accommodation or whether the administrator interfered with FHA-protected rights.

That problem is especially significant in public or federally supported housing programs. Residents and program participants in such programs often depend on the administering agency for accurate information, fair processing, and access to the correct legal framework. When a public administrator uses local program rules to displace federal disability protections, the harm is not limited to a single tenancy or ownership dispute. The integrity of federal fair-housing enforcement is affected.

Rice’s concern is not limited to this case. If a public housing administrator may respond to a disability-related accommodation request by never acknowledging fair-housing rights, never applying the FHA accommodation framework, and discussing only local program rules, then the judgment below supplies a practical roadmap for avoiding the FHA: recast the disabled person’s request as ordinary rule noncompliance and litigate the case on that substituted frame.

The decision below allowed the FHA framework to be displaced by a misleading local-compliance narrative

Rice’s case should have been adjudicated under the FHA accommodation and interference framework. The central questions were whether Rice requested a disability-related accommodation, whether the accommodation may have been necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, whether the City refused, delayed, or failed to properly consider that request, and whether the City threatened or interfered with Rice’s exercise or enjoyment of FHA rights.

Instead, Rice contends that the case was treated as an affordable-housing-agreement compliance dispute. That frame changed the inquiry. The jury was directed toward whether Rice complied with local program requirements, not whether the City had to reasonably modify rules, policies, practices, or services because of disability-related necessity, and not whether the City interfered with Rice’s FHA-protected accommodation rights.

That is not a harmless shift in emphasis. In an FHA accommodation case, the existence of a neutral rule does not end the analysis. The statute specifically asks whether a rule, policy, practice, or service must be accommodated. In an FHA interference case, conduct that threatens, burdens, misdirects, hampers, or obstructs the exercise of fair-housing rights may itself be unlawful. A misleading local-compliance frame can therefore eliminate the very federal questions Congress required courts to ask.

The Ninth Circuit’s Rule 50(b) reasoning does not answer the antecedent legal-framework question

The Ninth Circuit treated Rice’s appeal in part as barred by the absence of a post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion. Rice recognizes that Rule 50(b) limits appellate review of ordinary sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges. But this petition does not ask this Court to reweigh evidence or direct judgment for Rice on factual sufficiency grounds.

This Court’s decision in Dupree v. Younger, 143 S. Ct. 1382, 1391 (2023), confirms that a purely legal issue is distinct from a factual-sufficiency challenge. Rice’s petition does not ask this Court to reweigh the trial evidence or enter judgment in his favor. It asks whether the jury was ever permitted to decide his FHA accommodation and interference claims under the correct federal framework at all.

The question presented is antecedent to sufficiency. It asks whether the jury was ever permitted to adjudicate Rice’s FHA accommodation and interference theories under the correct legal framework. A verdict is entitled to deference when the correct legal question was put to the jury. But deference to a verdict does not answer a claim that the case was submitted to the jury through the wrong legal frame.

The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Rule 50(b) and Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2007), therefore illustrates why review is needed. Rule 50(b) may bar sufficiency review, but it should not permit a court of appeals to avoid the antecedent question whether federal civil-rights claims were adjudicated under the correct statutory framework. The certiorari question is not whether the evidence was sufficient. It is whether the FHA standards were ever fairly applied.

The FHA truthful-information issue supports review under Havens Realty

In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), this Court recognized that Congress conferred on all persons a legal right to truthful information about available housing. Havens involved false information about housing availability, but its reasoning reflects a broader point about the FHA: truthful housing information matters because false or misleading information can impair the exercise of fair-housing rights.

This case presents a related and important problem. When a disabled person seeks an accommodation in a housing program, truthful information about the applicable housing framework is essential. If the administrator gives or relies on a materially misleading frame, treating the request as ordinary program noncompliance rather than as an FHA accommodation request, the disabled person may be denied the practical ability to invoke and exercise FHA rights.

The Court should clarify whether the FHA’s protection of truthful housing information extends to truthful and materially complete information about accommodation rights and housing-program rights when a disabled person’s ability to use and enjoy housing depends on that information. At minimum, Havens supports the principle that the FHA is not indifferent to misleading housing-related information that impairs fair-housing rights.

The FHA accommodation-inquiry issue requires clarification

The FHA’s reasonable-accommodation provision requires housing providers to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when such accommodations may be necessary to afford equal housing opportunity. In many accommodation disputes, the practical mechanism for determining whether an accommodation is necessary, reasonable, or whether an alternative accommodation would suffice is an interactive process or accommodation inquiry.

Federal guidance recognizes the importance of this inquiry, particularly when a local government believes that an accommodation may impose a burden or require an alternative. But courts have not always clearly defined whether, when, and how the FHA requires an interactive process, or whether failure to engage in that process is independent evidence of a failure to accommodate.

This case presents the question in a concrete context. Rice contends that the City did not meaningfully inquire into his disability-related need, did not evaluate whether a rent-paying roommate may have been necessary or reasonable, and did not engage him under the FHA accommodation framework before refusing, delaying, or reframing his request. Instead, the City treated the matter as local program compliance.

This case is also a concrete vehicle for clarification because the requested accommodation arose in a setting where multiple legal frameworks pointed toward an accommodation inquiry. The FHA required consideration of reasonable accommodation; California fair-housing law recognized accommodation and interactive-process obligations; and San Francisco’s own Planning Code identified a local reasonable-modification in regulations, policies, practices and procedures  process. The City nevertheless treated Rice’s request as ordinary program noncompliance.

The Court should clarify that a housing provider or public housing-program administrator may not avoid the FHA accommodation inquiry by declining to engage the disability-related question and recasting the matter as ordinary program enforcement. Whether described as an interactive process, an accommodation inquiry, a duty to evaluate disability-related need, or entitlement to an accommodation process, the FHA requires more than ignoring the federal accommodation framework. The conflict between the accommodation frameworks and the compliance frame is precisely why clarification is needed.

The independent § 3617 interference issue should not be collapsed into the

accommodation claim

Section 3617 separately prohibits coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with the exercise or enjoyment of FHA rights. Rice’s § 3617 theory was not merely duplicative of his § 3604(f)(3)(B) accommodation theory. He contended that the City’s conduct threatened, burdened, misdirected, obstructed, and hampered his effort to exercise FHA accommodation rights.

If a public entity can avoid § 3617 review simply by characterizing its conduct as local program enforcement, then the interference provision loses practical force in precisely the setting where interference may be most effective. A disabled person may be told that the matter is not an FHA accommodation issue at all, that the only relevant issue is program compliance, and that enforcement consequences will follow unless the person abandons the accommodation effort.

The Court should clarify that § 3617 remains independently available when local housing-program actions burden, obstruct, interfere, or hamper a disabled person’s exercise or enjoyment of FHA rights, even if the public entity characterizes its conduct as enforcement of local program rules.

This case is a suitable vehicle despite the procedural posture

Respondents may argue that this case is a poor vehicle because the Ninth Circuit invoked Rule 50(b), plain-error jury-instruction review, harmless error, and the absence of a civil right to effective assistance of counsel. Those procedural features do not defeat the petition because the question presented is not factual sufficiency, attorney effectiveness, or mere dissatisfaction with the jury verdict.

The question is whether the governing FHA framework was applied at all. Rice raised that issue in his pro se rehearing petition, explaining that the appeal challenged the legal frame of the trial, not merely the sufficiency of the evidence. The Ninth Circuit did not address whether the City’s affordable-housing-agreement compliance frame was legally sufficient to displace or replace the FHA accommodation and interference inquiry.

That omission makes this case a useful vehicle. The record presents a concrete example of a disabled person’s accommodation request in a public housing-program setting being treated as local program noncompliance, with the federal FHA framework allegedly displaced throughout the litigation. The legal question is recurring, important, and capable of review without reweighing the trial evidence.

Review is necessary to protect disabled persons in public and federally supported housing programs

This case matters beyond the parties. Public and federally supported housing programs are often administered through detailed local rules. Those rules may be important, but they cannot displace federal civil-rights protections. The FHA specifically contemplates that rules, policies, practices, and services may need to be reasonably accommodated because of disability.

If lower courts allow public housing-program administrators to convert disability-accommodation disputes into ordinary compliance disputes, disabled persons may lose the practical benefit of federal law. They may be denied truthful information about their rights, denied an accommodation inquiry, and denied adjudication of independent interference claims. This Court’s review is warranted to prevent local administrative frames from swallowing federal FHA protections.

Conclusion

For the reasons and explanations stated above, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.