Briefly, in October 2004, Rice (a mentally disabled veteran) obtained a Limited Equity Home Ownership Program (LEHP) below-market-rate condominium (BMR) thru a lottery process, all of which was administered by the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (SFRA), a State of California agency. The controlling agreement (LEHP Declaration of Resale Restrictions and Option to Purchase Agreement) contained a restriction that required “written” consent from the Agency to lease a portion of his BMR (i.e. having rent-paying roommates). The Agreement also required residency ten months every calendar year but, with “written” consent, less than ten months was allowed.

In 2012, all the State of California Redevelopment Agencies were closed, and the “assets” of the SFRA were transferred to the San Francisco Mayor’s Office of Housing and Community Development (MOHCD), which became the administrating agency of the LEHP (Program).

On or about December 2008, by phone, Rice verbally requested from Edith Horner (his primary contact at the SFRA) permission to have roommates and to be allowed to travel more than two months per calendar year, Horner verbally consented (but did not provide any guidance on the “written” consent requirement). In any case, from numerous conversations with Rice, Horner (and the SFRA) fully knew of Rice’s disabled status and his disability related needs (i.e. symptoms of his mental illness, predominantly isolation and loneliness, as well as depression). And, thereafter, Rice did have rent-paying roommates and did travel more than two months per calendar year. In March 2016, Rice read the controlling agreement throughly for the first time and saw the “written” consent requirement. Rice immediately reached out to Horner (then a CCSF employee) via email, and to Garrett Smith of the MOHCD by voicemail, and informed them of his lack of “written” consent, neither Horner or Smith responded despite prior communications.

IMPORTANT – accommodations under the Fair Housing Act are not required to be in writing. Whereas, what the MOHCD call policy “exceptions” are required to be in writing per the controlling Limited Equity Home Ownership Agreement (LEHP).

When the MOHCD (specifically Cissy Yin and Maria Benjamin of the MOHCD, and Deputy City Attorney Keith Nagayama) finally responded (on October 26, 2017) to Rice’s (and his physician’s) request to obtain the “written” consent for his disability related accommodation, the MOHCD sent an “Action Required” letter that was completely void of any recognition of Rice’s disability, his disabled status, and his disability related needs (and “rights”) under the FHA, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and San Francisco’s Planning Department Code sec. 305.1 (which establishes CCSF’s “policy for people with disabilities”, “a process for making and acting upon requests for reasonable modifications to the regulations, policies, practices, and procedures of the Planning Department and Code” — which governs the MOHCD). And, it was completely void of any information that the Planning Department’s Zoning Administrator is CCSF’s authorized person to make and act on requests for reasonable accommodation in the LEHP (NOT the MOHCD).

Instead of providing the disability related information Rice needed (as required by fair housing law), Yin, Benjamin, and Nagayama ORDERED Rice to abandon his verbally obtain accommodation to have rent-paying roommates. and THREATENED him with “enforcement action” if he did not comply. Out of great fear, Rice immediately complied.

Thereafter, despite Rice’s very numerous attempts over several months to obtain information about re-obtaining his valid disability related accommodation for rent-paying roommates under fair housing law (including CCSF’s own ordinance), Neither Yin, Benjamin, or Nagayama ever provided any information they were required to provide Rice under fair housing law (including CCSF’s own ordinance). Instead, they only communicated certain parts of CCSF’s affordable housing program’s policies. That is, they concealed relevant information they were otherwise required to provide to Rice, including the previously stated fact that the San Francisco Planning Department’s Zoning Administrator is CCSF’s person to make and act on requests for reasonable accommodation in the LEHP (not the MOHCD).

Thus, the conflict that created Allison Barton Rice v. City and County of San Francisco, et al.

To be clear, had CCSF employees Ms. Cissy Yin, Ms. Maria Benjamin, and Mr. Keith Nagayama referred Mr. Allison Barton Rice to the Planning Department’s Zoning Administrator (as they were required to do), Rice would have received appropriate processing and consideration of his requested disability related accommodation. And, had they done so, it is extremely unlikely this Kafkaesque legal ordeal would have ever existed.

Quoting the District Court: “I think — this is for Mr. Rice. I was completely wrong on my round one motion to dismiss, not just because the Ninth Circuit told me so but in sort of rethinking it, Mr. Rice was right in his round one motion, and I’m convinced of that now, and, again, not just because the Ninth Circuit told me, but I too got — you know, I got sucked into the affordable housing in San Francisco, and that wasn’t something I should have done in a motion to dismiss phase, and — but I got sucked in by it because I thought, well, San Francisco is trying to do what it can for affordable housing. But Mr. Rice was right and said — so said the Ninth Circuit. And I’m convinced now that that’s — that’s right. Like, I was wrong. So, you know, I’m always glad to know when I’m wrong.” (June 15th 2023 pretrial hearing — one day before the start of the trial — transcript, p. 66, 12-25.)

Point of clarification by me (i.e. “Mr. Rice”): In my view, the District Court (i.e. the Honorable Laurel Beeler) wasn’t “wrong” — instead, [She] was “wronged” (i.e. “got sucked into the affordable housing in San Francisco”) by the City Attorney’s’ “affordable housing” program narrative (i.e. reframing) as opposed to the applicable and truthful (i.e. “Mr. Rice was right”) Fair Housing Act, inclusive of disability and fair housing laws, narrative (i.e. frame) asserted in both my original and amended complaints, which I continue to assert because it is the truth. Pointedly, please consider my physician’s September 19, 2017 letter (mailed by her directly to the MOHCD) and, without any inquiry, the MOHCD’s October 26th 2017 “Action Required” letter (by Cissy Yin, Maria Benjamin, and Keith Nagayama) sent to, and received by, me on October 26, 2017. Lastly, the Honorable Beeler held herself accountable. The critical question is, will the District Court (or any court of jurisdiction) ever hold the City Attorney and Deputy City Attorneys involved in this case accountable for sucking the District Court “into the affordable housing in San Francisco”?

To be clear and certain, “Mr. Rice was right” the entire time, and still is. Because, simply, from before the relevant period, during the relevant period, and after the relevant period, Mr. Rice told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth — and continues to do just that. Whereas, defendant City and County of San Francisco, et al. has not; which I claim in my appeals to the Ninth Circuit.

This section is for anyone that cares to have more details of my lawsuit against CCSF. Litigation begins, District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, appearing pro se, Case No. 19-cv-04250 LB: my Original Complaint and Exhibits, CCSF’s Motion to Dismiss, my Opposition, CCSF’s Reply, District Court’s Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend. Amended Complaint, CCSF’s Motion to Dismiss, my Opposition, CCSF’s Reply, Declaration of Dr. Ludwig in Support of [my] Claims, District Court’s Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice.

Initial appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, appearing pro se, Case No. 20-15087; Opening, Answering, and Reply Briefs at Dkt. Nos. 2.0, 8.0, and 15.0, respectively), Ninth Circuit’s Memorandum reversing dismissal of my FHA claims.

Back at the District Court … this part is a lot, will take time (i.e. work in progress). Going to start with the December 22, 2022 hearing transcript, May 25, 2023 hearing transcript, June 15, 2023 hearing transcript, and the trial transcript. — at the Ninth Circuit — subsequent to the Ninth Circuit’s Mandate, I am back at the District Court which filed the Ninth Circuit’s Mandate on July 17, 2026. My July 21, 2026 Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Relief of Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) or, in the Alternative, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3) For Fraud on the Court; [Proposed] Order, followed by my July 22, 2026 Correct description of Ex. G attached to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment at ECF No. 288. CCSF’s Opposition and Plaintiff’s Reply, Stipulated Administrative Motion to Continue the Hearing Date. My Motion for Relief of Judgement Denied.

Primary appeal in the Ninth Circuit seeking reversal of judgment, appearing pro se, Case No. 23-16013; Opening, Answering, and Reply Briefs at Dkt. Nos. 17.1, 26.1, and 31.1, respectively.

Secondary appeal in the Ninth Circuit seeking reversal of award of CCSF’s Bill of Costs, appearing pro se, Case No. 24-2217; Opening, Answering, and Reply Briefs at Dkt. Nos. 7.1, 12.1, and 18.1, respectively.

Primary appeal: My May 2, 2026 (Dkt 65) Motion for referral to the Ninth Circuit’s Standing Committee under Circuit Rule 46-2 to investigate CCSF’s counsel’s violations of FRAP 46(c) and ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(1),(3), CCSF’s Counsel’s May 12, 2026 (Dkt 66) Opposition, and my May 13, 2026 (Dkt 67) Reply. My May 29, 2026 (Dkt 72) Motion to Appear Remotely and Statement in Support of Oral Argument. Without oral argument, the Ninth Circuit’s June 2, 2026 (Dkt 73) Memorandum, Judgement AFFIRMED:

“Rice waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict by failing to file a post-verdict motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). See Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that plain error review is precluded when a party fails to file a Rule 50(b) motion).”

I very much give thanks to my ignorance, stupidity, mental illness, and the deficient work of my prior pro bono attorneys.

“We reject as unsupported by the record Rice’s contentions that the trial was unfair or that he was denied any right to effective assistance of counsel. See Penk v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 816 F.2d 458, 465-66 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting the broad discretion afforded district courts in controlling the conduct of a trial); Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Generally, a plaintiff in a civil case has no right to effective assistance of counsel.”).”

If opposing counsel’s misconduct (which I characterized as fraud-on-the-court) is acceptable then I guess it was fair, right? And, I did not claim I had a right to effective assistance of counsel. I simply stated that my pro bono counsel was deficient, because it was.

“Rice’s motion for sanctions (Docket No. 65) and motion to appear remotely for oral argument (Docket No. 72) are denied.”

My motion-for-sanctions was a request for referral to the Ninth Circuit Standing Committee under Circuit Rule 46-2 to investigate whether CCSF’s counsel violated FRAP 46(c) and ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(1),(3) through repeated knowing material misrepresentations, omissions, and concealments of material facts to this Court, as I claimed and made clear with irrefutable written evidence from CCSF’s own filings to the Ninth Circuit. The point here is the Ninth Circuit chose to not even consider whether the City’s attorney and his deputies engaged knowingly made false statements of fact (or half-truths that rendered affirmative statements materially misleading) and concealment of material facts or documents in this case.

My June 5, 2026 (Dkt 74) Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, my June 9, 2026 (Dkt 75) Motion to Submit Addendum to Petition for Panel Rearing and Rehearing En Banc, my June 18, 2026 (Dkt 77) Corrected Motion for Appointment of Counsel [in this appeal], and my June 23, 2026 (Dkt 79) Motion, reclassified by the Court to the appropriate Rule 28(j) Citation of Supplemental Authorities in Support of my Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. CCSF’s June 29, 2026 (Dkt 80) Response to my motion for Appointment of Counsel, my June 30, 2026 (Dkt 81) reply. My June 30, 2026 (Dkt 82) Notice of Potential Transcript-Completeness Issue and Motion to Stay Appellate Proceedings Pending District Court Determination Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e). Additional July 2, 2026 (Dkt 83) Rule 28(j) and July 5, 2026 (Dkt 84) Rule 28(j) Citation in further Support of my Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. The Ninth Circuit’s July 6, 2026 (Dkt 85) Order, everything DENIED.

On a more personal level, I guess – in my opinion – it was foolish, naive, and downright stupid of me to think the judicial system (i.e. the courts) in the United States of America would ever consider holding any of their fellow attorneys accountable for corruption. Maybe, hopefully, eventually the District Court or the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court will prove me wrong in this regard and restore some modicum of faith in the USA judicial system for me and the rest of the world.

I am working on a petition for certiorari for the Supreme Court (I know, less than 1% chance of being accepted, but I have to try because this case, the relevant facts, the relevant statutes, the relevant case law, the relevant rules, the circuit splits, etc. are just that important to at least put that effort in). My July 7, 2026 (Dkt 86) Motion to Stay Issuance of the Mandate Pending Preparation and Filing of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari (in the United States Supreme Court), July 8, 2026 (Dkt 87) Order, Rice’s motion to stay the mandate (Docket No. 86) is DENIED. No further motions will be entertained in this case. July 16, 2026 (Dkt 88) Mandate. Returning to the District Court (above).

Secondary appeal: Unexpected June 17, 2026 Ninth Circuit (Dkt 30) Order (“The Court is inclined to appoint pro bono counsel to represent appellant [Rice] in this appeal.”), and my June 17, 2026 (Dkt 31) Response (accepting the Court’s appointment of pro bono counsel to represent me in this appeal).